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VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, 
An Infant who sues by his Parents 
and Next of Friends, 
Tom and Amy Maddox, 
v. 
COMMONWEAL TH OF VIRGINIA, 
SERVE: Office of the Attorney General 
900 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, Joshua Maddox, an Infant who sues by his Parents and 
Next of Friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, and moves for judgment against the 
Commonwealth of Virginia pursuant to the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Va. Code § 8.01-
195.1 et seq. , on the grounds and in the amount set forth below: 
1. That on or about September 22, 2001, at or about 2:15 p.m., Joshua 
Maddox was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk running down Washington Street in the 
area in Amelia County commonly referred to as Amelia Village. 
2. That on the aforesaid date and at the aforesaid time Joshua Maddox was 
riding down the Washington Street sidewalk when the front tire of his bicycle caught on 
the inside edge of the sidewalk. 
3. That as a result of his tire meeting with the sharp inside edge of the 
sidewalk, Joshua and his bicycle were propelled into the air and Joshua landed on his 





COUNT I: NEGLIGENT CONSTRUCTION 
4. This plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in 
Paragraphs 1-3, inclusive, as though fully set out herein. 
5. That the existing dangerous condition of the Washington Street sidewalk 
is the result of a project constructed and completed by the Commonwealth and known 
as the Route 1003 State Highway Project, No. 1003-004-172-501 (hereinafter "the 
Project"). 
6. That the portion of the Project at issue is the public sidewalk which runs 
down Washington Street behind the Amelia County Courthouse and abuts the property 
located at 9062 Washington Street. 
5. That defendant, the Commonwealth, was negligent in creating the sharp 
and sudden drop off from the sidewalk into the adjoining yard where the accident 
occurred. 
7. Specifically, the defendant could have prevented creating the dangerous 
condition at issue by constructing a retaining wall and/or adequately backfilling the 
adjoining area. 
8. In creating the hazardous condition of the sidewalk area in question, 
the defendant failed to use ordinary care in both planning and constructing the changes 
and alterations to the area at issue. 
9. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, and 
recklessness of the defendant, Joshua sustained serious and permanent injuries, has 
suffered and will continue to suffer in the future great pain of body and mind, has 
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sustained permanent disability and deformity, and has incurred and may incur in the 
future hospital, doctors, and other related bills in an effort to be cured of said injuries. 
COUNT II: NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE 
1 o. This plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in 
Paragraphs 1-9, inclusive, as though fully set out herein. 
11. That the existing dangerous condition of the Washington Street sidewalk 
is the result of a the Project negligently maintained by the Commonwealth. 
12. That the portion of the Project at issue is the public sidewalk which runs 
down Washington Street behind the Amelia County Courthouse and abuts the property 
located at 9062 Washington Street. 
13. The defendant, the Commonwealth, was negligent in maintaining the 
sharp and sudden drop off from the sidewalk into the adjoining yard at the point where 
the accident occurred. 
14. _ Specifically, the defendant could have prevented the negligent 
maintenance of the area at issue by constructing a retaining wall and/or adequately 
backfilling the adjoining area. 
15. In allowing the hazardous condition of the sidewalk area to continue, the 
defendant failed to use ordinary care in the maintenance of the area at is~ue. 
16. As a direct and proximate cause of the negligence, carelessness, and 
recklessness of the defendant, Joshua sustained serious and permanent injuries, has 
suffered and will continue to suffer in the future great pain of body and mind, has 
sustained permanent disability and deformity, and has incurred and may incur in the 
future hospital, doctors, and other related bills in an effort to be cured of said injuries. 
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COUNT Ill: CREATING A NUISANCE 
1 7. This plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in 
Paragraphs 1-16, inclusive, as though fully set out herein. 
18. Additionally, the defendant, the Commonwealth of Virginia, created a 
nuisance when they failed to take measures to guard against the sharp and dangerous 
sidewalk ledge which they left exposed to Joshua Maddox and other members of the 
community. 
19. That the sharp drop off created by the defendant imperils the saf~ty of the 
public sidewalk area at issue and is dangerous and hazardous in and of itself. 
20. That the dangerous condition created by the defendants is so significant 
that it caused real and substantial injuries to Joshua Maddox as an individual. 
21. That the injuries suffered by Joshua Maddox are distinct from and 
different than those suffered by the public at large. 
COUNT IV: MAINTAINING A NUISANCE 
22. This plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in 
Paragraphs 1-22, inclusive, as though fully set out herein. 
23. The defendant, the Commonwealth of Virginia, maintained a nuisance 
by allowing Joshua Maddox and other members of the community to be continuously 
exposed to the dangerous sidewalk ledge at issue. 
24. That the sharp drop off maintained by the defendant imperils the safety of 
the public sidewalk area at issue and is dangerous and hazardous in and of itself. 
25. That the dangerous condition created by the defendant is so significant 
that it caused real and substantial injuries to Joshua Maddox as an individual. 
4 
26. That the injuries suffered by Joshua Maddox are distinct from and 
different than those suffered by the public at large. 
COUNT V: PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
27. This plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the facts set forth in 
Paragraphs 1-26, inclusive, as though fully set out herein. 
28. The defendant, the Commonwealth of Virginia, demonstrated 
a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others in leaving the sidewalk in such 
dangerous condition and failing to fill in the large drop off from the sidewalk. T~e 
plaintiff believes the defendant's construction and maintenance of this dangerous 
condition shows such indifference to the safety of others as to constitute an utter 
disregard of caution amounting to a complete neglect of the safety of Joshua Maddox 
and others in the community. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, by counsel, respectfully moves this Court to award 
judgment against the defendant in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($300,000.00) in compensatory damages and TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($250,000.00) in punitive damages. This plaintiff also 
demands that his costs and interest on any award be assessed as of the day of the 
incident referenced herein, and such other relief as this Court may deem appropriate. 
Trial by jury is demanded. 
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.J. CLv 
Te e W. Cabell, Esquire 
Jay e A. Pemberton, Esquire 
Schaffer & Cabell, P .C. 
416 West Franklin Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23220 
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VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, an infant 
Who sues by his parents and next 
Friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, 
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v. Case No. L02-57 
COMMONWEAL TH OF VIRGINIA, 
Defendant. 
PLEA OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The defendant, the Commonwealth of Virginia, by counsel, asks this Court to 
enter an order sustaining its Plea of Sovereign Immunity and dismissing this action as to 
the Commonwealth of Virginia. A Memorandum in support of this Plea is filed herewith. 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, an infant 
Who sues by his parents and next 
Friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLEA OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Case No. L02-57 
The defendant, the Commonwealth of Virginia (the "Commonwealth"), by 
counsel, asks this Court to enter an order sustaining its Plea of Sovereign Immunity and 
dismissing this action. In support of this Plea, the Commonwealth states the following: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the Motion for Judgment, on or about September 22, 2001, Joshua 
Maddox (hereinafter "Maddox" or the "plaintiff') was riding his bike on a sidewalk 
adjacent to Washington Street in the "Amelia Village" area of Amelia County. Motion 
for Judgment ,1. Plaintiff alleges that as he rode his bike, "the front tire of his bicycle 
caught on the inside edge of the sidewalk:." Motion for Judgment iJ2. As a consequence, 
he alleges he fell from his bike and injured his left elbow. Motion for Judgment iJ3. 
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants "were negligent in creating the sharp and 
sudden drop off from the sidewalk into the adjoining yard ... " Motion for Judgment iJS 





prevented the "dangerous condition" by constructing the sidewalk in a different manner, 
including addition of a retaining wall or back filling the adjoining area. Motion for 
Judgment ~7. The negligence alleged results from an alleged failure "to use ordinary care 
in both planning and constructing the changes and alterations to the area at issue." 
Motion for Judgment ~8. 
Count II of the Motion for Judgment, while titled a claim for ''Negligent 
Maintenance" is not different in any meaningful way from Count I ''Negligent 
Construction." · The allegations are that the Commonwealth "was negligent in 
maintaining the sharp and sudden drop off from the sidewalk" and "could have prevented 
negligent maintenance of the area at issue by constructing a retaining wall and/or 
adequately backfilling the adjoining area." Motion for Judgment if~l3 and 14. These are 
identical to the allegations of the Count I. The basis of both counts is that the 
Commonwealth should have selected a different, and allegedly better design for 
construction of this sidewalk and adjacent area. 
Further, plaintiff alleges as a basis for recovery, in Counts m, and IV, the creation 
and maintenance of a nuisance by its failure ''to take measures to guard against the sharp 
and dangerous sidewalk ledge ... " Motion for Judgment if I 8. 
Finally, plaintiff seeks punitive damages against the Commonwealth. Motion for 
Judgment, Count V. 
ARGUMENT 
VDOT is immune from claims in plaintiffs Motion for Judgment based upon the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is basic tenant of Virginia law that the 
Commonwealth is immune from actions for damages except to the extent it has waived 
2 
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such immunity. See e.g. Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 248, 250-51, 467 S.E.2d 
783, 784 (1996); Melonson v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 433, __ 
(2001). 
A. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM PURSUING A CLAIM FOR 
NEGLIGENCE IN DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION 
The claims for negligent construction, regardless of how described, are barred by 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Virginia Tort Claims Act is strictly limited in· 
scope, and as a statute and derogation of common law must be strictly construed. 
Baumgardner v. So~thwestern Mental Health Institute, 247 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d 
400, 402 (1994). Specifically excluded under the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity is: 
(2) Any claim based upon an act or omission of the Legislature, or any 
member of the staff thereof acting in his official capacity, or to the legislative 
function of any agency subject to the provisions of this article. 
Virginia Code§ 8.01-195.3(2) (emphasis added). 
The decision to construct, plan and design state highways is a highly discretionary 
legislative function that has been delegated to VDOT. See Stewart v. Fugate, 212 Va. 
689, 692, 187 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1972); Mumpower v. Housing Authority v. City of Bristol, 
176 Va. 426, 454, 11 S.E.2d 732, 743 (1940). In Ord v. Fugate, 207 Va. 752, 152 S.E.2d 
54 (1967), land owners sued to have the state put the road adjacent to their property in a 
travelable condition. The Court noted that while practical necessity requires that the 
administration of the public highway system be delegated to subordinate officials, 
"nevertheless . . . the Legislature has supreme powers to open, improve, repair, 
discontinue or abandon public highways." Id. at 759, 152 S.E.2d at 59. Further, 
In adopting a plan for the improvement or repair of its streets or 
highways a public authority acts in a quasi judicial or legislative 
capacity ... the public authority will not be held liable merely 
3 
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because in the opinion of a jury a safer or better plan might have 
been adopted or because in their opinion it chose the less safe of 
two plans. 
Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. Cir. 191, 194 (Smyth, August 4, 1987) (quoting 39 
Am.Jur. 2d Highways, Streets and Bridges, Section 353) (opinion attached hereto as 
Exhibit A). In Cochrane, the Circuit Court held that decisions of VDOT concerning the 
slope of a roadway bank, the width of a shoulder or the building of a "rock fence" are 
decisions of design, plan or construction and as such, "they fall within the legislative 
function" of the Commonwealth, are discretionary in nature and are thus excluded from 
the Act. Id. at 195. 
The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that decisions regarding the 
placement of safety devices involves the use of discretion and constitutes a governmental 
function. See Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1990) 
(providing immunity from suits over warning signs, safety devices, street lights and street 
design); Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 370-71, 397 S.E.2d 832, 835 
(1990) (providing immunity from suits over the installation of lights, barricades, and 
safety devices). 
In the present case plaintiff alleges negligence in the alleged failure to construct a 
retaining wall or adequately backfill an area adjoining the sidewalk, and a failure to plan 
and construct appropriate changes and alterations to the area at issue. See Motion for 
Judgment iJiJ6&7. Such claims challenge the discretionary and legislative functions of 
VDOT and are specifically excluded under the Act. These claims are therefore barred by 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
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B. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM PURSUING A CLAIM FOR 
CREATING OR MAINTAINING A NUISANCE 
Without conceding that the plaintiffs claim for nuisance is in fact distinguishable 
from the allegations of negligent construction contained in the Motion for Judgment, the 
Commonwealth further argues that the Commonwealth is immune from an action for 
nuisance under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The Virginia Supreme Court has explained "that governmental imniunity 
applie[s] to [a] nuisance claim." Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 374, 397 
S.E.2d 832 (1990) citing Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 258-9, 117 S.E.2d 96, 
100 (1960). Such claims may not be maintained against the Commonwealth. Id. While 
other issues arise where nuisance claims are pursued against municipal corporations, such 
claims against the Commonwealth are barred. 
C. THE COMMONWEALTH IS IMMUNE FOR CLAIMS FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The Commonwealth also is immune from any claims for damages in excess of 
$100,000, or claims for punitive damages. The Virginia Tort Claims Act is in derogation 
of common law and therefore should be strictly construed. Baumgardner v. Southwestern 
Mental Health Institute, 241 Va. 486, 489, 442 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1994). The Act clearly 
states the recovery against the Commonwealth shall be limited to $100,000. Va. Code§ 
8.01-195.3. Further, the code provides, in pertinent part," ... neither the Commonwealth 
nor any transportation district shall be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive 
damages." (emphasis added). Va. Code§ 8.01-195.3. 
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Therefore, to the extent any claim may remain, the Commonwealth moves to 
strike any claim for damages in excess of $100,000 as against it, and further moves to 
strike any claim for punitive damages against the Commonwealth. 
WHEREFORE, the Commonwealth of Virginia asks this Court to enter an order 
sustaining its plea of immunity for all the reasons stated above, and dismissing this 
action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 




JERRY W. KILGORE 
Attorney General of Virginia 
EDWARD M. MACON 
Senior Assistant Attorney General 
E~ SCOTT MOORE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
900 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Telephone: (804) 786-8198 
Facsimile: (804) 371-2087 
Counsel for the Virginia Department of Transportation 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 15th day of November, 2002 to: 
Temple W. Cabell, Esquire 
Schaffer & Cabell, P .C. 
416 West Franklin Street 
Richmond, VA 23220 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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Courtney Cochrane v. Commonwcalw uf Virginia 
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] 
CIRCUIT COURT OF SMYTII COUNTY, VIRGINIA 
9 Va. Cir. 191; 1987 Va. Cir. LEXIS 88 
August 4, 1987 
HEADNOTES: (** 1} 
The decisions to build a road and when and where to 
build it are legislative decisions which are exempt 
from the Ton Claims Act by Section 8.01-195.3(2). 
JUDGES: 
JUDGE CHARLES H. SMITH, JR. 
OPINIONBY: SMITH 
OPINION: The court has reviewed the entire file in 
this matter including previous motions, orders and 
memoranda. This opinion will dispose of the only 
remaining motion and that is the defendant's claim that 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity should apply and 
deprive this coun of subject maner jurisdiction. 
The facts of the case are fairly simple. The plaintiff 
sues for damages allegedly sustained due to the 
negligence of the defendant in the "maintenance" of 1-
81 at a point approximately one mile north of 
Chilhowie in ·the north bound lane. The plaintiff was 
traveling on the interstate at this location on April S, 
1984, when his vehicle was struck by a large boulder 
which apparently rolled off a slope adjacent to the 
· highway. The plaintiff allegedly sustained property 
damage and personal injuries as a result of this 
collision. 
The plaintiff contends that his claim falls squarely 
within the provision of the Virginia Ton Claims Act. 
(Section 8.01-195.1 et seq. of the Code) The 
defendant, { .. 2} while conceding that the Act 
panially erodes the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, nevertheless, contends that this claim is 
excluded from the coverage of the Act insofar as it 
relates to the original location, plan or design of the 
highway. The real issue presented then. is whether the 
suit can proceed on the theory of negligent 
maintenance by the sovereign under the Ton Claims 
Act or whether it is barred as being one for negligence 
in original plan. construction or design of the highway. 
The interstate is a state highway facility, owned by Jhe 
Commonwealth of Virginia and operated throug~ ihe 
State Department of Highways and Transportation. 
(Section 33.1-48 of the Code) The State Highway and 
Transportation Commissioner has the power to "do all 
acts necessary or convenient for the constructing, 
16 
improving and maintaining the roads embraced i 
system of state highways and to promote the inti 
of the Commonwealth in the area of p 
transportation..11 (Section 3~.1-13 of the Code) 
As both counsel have quite aptly and ably pointec 
the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity de 
from the monarchial tenet that "the king can d 
wrong." 
In modem times. {**3} it is more often explainc 
a rule of social policy, which protects the state : 
burdensome interference with the perfonnance c 
governmental function and preserves its control 
the state funds, property and instrUmcntalities. 
public service might be hindered and the public ~ 
endangered if the supreme authority could be subje 
to suit at the instance of every citizen, 
consequently controlled in the use and dispositio: 
the means required for the proper adminisuation oJ 
government. (72 Am. Jur. 2d, States, Territories 
Dependencies, sect. 99 .) 
The size and complexity of modem state govemm 
has mandated a relaxation of the strict rule 
sovereign immunity. As the court stated in Jame 
Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.ld 864 (1980): 
The Commonwealth of Virginia functions c 
through its elected and appointed officials : 
employees. If because of the threat of litigation, 01 
any other reason, they cannot act, or refuse to act 
state also ceases to act. Although a valid re:ison ex 
for state employee immunity, the argument for s1 
immunity does not have the same strength it hac 
past years. This is because of the intrusion· 
government into {**4} areas formerly private. · 
because of the thousand-fold increase in the numbe,1 
government employees. 
Virginia, like most states, conscious of the vas~ 
and complexity of state government and conscio~ 
the growing cxposmc to liability attendant thereto, ! 
seen fit to shed the cloak of immunity in a limited cl 
Page 
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of cases with the rec.. adoption of the Virginia Ton 
Claims Act. 
The Supreme Coun of Virginia said in Elizabeth 
Ril'er Tunnel District v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 
S.E.2d 685 (1961): 
waiver of immunity cannot be implied from general 
statutory language or by implication. Statutory 
language granting consent to suit must be explicitly 
and expressly assumed. 
Section 8.01-195.3 of the Virginia Ton Claims Act 
explicitly excludes: 
(2) Any claim based upon an act or omission of the 
General Assembly ... or to the legislative function of 
any agency subject to the provisions of this article. 
As a general rule, a public authority in deciding 
whether or not to build a road. when and where to 
build it. and its general plan and design acts in a 
legislative or quasi-judicial capacity. For such 
discretionary acts in its legislative capacity, there has 
historically been {**5} no attendant liability ·and the 
General Assembly would appear to have preserved this 
immunity by the above exclusion. 
The defendant was empowered by its Chaner to lay 
off streets and walks, and improve the same. but it was 
wholly within its discretion when and where it would 
do so. For the omission to exercise the power, it being 
legislative and discretionary, it would not be liable for 
any injury occurring in consequence of the omission 
although when the power was exercise~ the duty to 
keep the streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel would become a ministerial and 
positive duty, for the neglect whereof it would be 
liable for an injury resulting therefrom. 2 Dillon Mun. 
Corp. (4th Ed.) sections 949 and 1048. Jones' 
Administrator, .• City of Richmond, 118 Va. 612, 88 
S.E. 82.In adopting a plan for the improvement or 
repair of its streets or highways a public authority acts 
in a quasi-judicial or legislative capacity, and as a 
general rule will not be liable for consequential 
damages to individuals who are injured in their persons 
or propeny by reason of errors or defects in plan 
adopted. even though reasonable men might differ-· as 
to which plan should have been adopted. { .. 6} ·The 
public authority will not be held liable merely because 
in the opinion of a jury a safer or better plan might 
have bee.n adopted or because in their opinion it chose 
17 
the less' .... c of' two plans. 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Highwa=.· 
Streets and Bridges. section 353. 
The defendant. in its memorandum, cites two case 
one from THas, Stanford ,. • State Department c 
Highways, etc., 635 S.W.2d 581 (1982), and one frOJ 
New York, Stuart-Bullock v. State, 38 A.D.2d. 62C 
326 N.Y .S.ld 909 (1971), in support of its claim c 
immunity in this case due to exercise of a discretionar 
function. Both cases involved damages allcgedl 
sustained due to negligent failure to consnuct curbs o 
guard rails. Both states have, by statute or otherwise 
shed the cloak of sovereign immunity in such case~ 
The court ruled for· the defendant in each case on tb 
theory that liability attaches to negligent maintcnanc1 
and repairs and not to negligent consuuction or desigD 
In the Texas case the coun defmed maintenance a 
follows "to bold or keep in any panicular state o 
efficiency ... to keep up, not to suffer, to fail o 
decline." Section 33.1-23.02 of the Code dcfme~ 
maintenance as follows: 
the term "maintenance" shall {**7} include ordina~ 
maintenance, maintenance replacement, and any othe: 
categories of maintenance which may be designated b~ 
the Commissioner. 
The court is of the opinion that the language of tht 
Virginia Ton Claims Act evinces an intent by the 
General Assembly to preserve unto the 
Commonwealth and its agencies immunity from sui~ 
for acts discretionary in nature. Decisions conceminE 
the slope of a bank, the width of a shoulder or the 
building of a 11rock" fence are decisions of design. plar 
or construction and not maintenance. As such they fa!: 
within the legislative function of the defcndnnt, arc 
discretionary in nature, and are thus excluded from the 
Act. The coun would, therefore, grant defendant's 
motion insofar as it pertains to the introduction o1 
evidence regarding same. 
The plaintiff further contends that the defendant 
undertook major repairs in the area of the accideni 
some six days before the accident. He contends that the 
defendant negligently removed supponing soil and 
rock which proximately caused the accident. The coun 
is of the opinion that such maintenance operations fall 
within the purview of the Act and are clearl) 
cognizable by the coun. I believe this issue { ••g} is 




VIRGIN I A: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, 
An Infant who sues by his Parents 
and Next of Friends, 
Tom and Amy Maddox, 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No.: L02-57 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION . 
TO DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
~OMES NOW the plaintiff, Joshua Maddox, an infant by his parents and next 
friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, by counsel, and moves this Court to deny the 
defendant's, the Commonwealth of Virginia (hereinafter the "Commonwealth"), Plea of 
Sovereign Immunity; in support hereof, this plaintiff states as follows: 
I. . Statement of Facts 
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on September 22, 2001. The 
plaintiff, Joshua Maddox, was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk running down 
Washington Street in Amelia Village (hereinafter "Washington Street sidewalk"). As 
Joshua was riding his bike, his front tire became caught on the inside edge of the 
Washington Street sidewalk. When Joshua's tire became caught, his bicycle was 
propelled into the air and he was thrown into the lawn of the adjoining property located 
at 9062 Washington Street. Joshua came to rest on his left elbow, which was broken 
as a result of the accident. 
. . 
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he sustained as a result of the dangerous condition created in Amelia Village. A 
dangerous condition that was the product of the defendant's own negligence, 
carelessness, and reckle~sness in planning and constructing the changes to the area at 
issue. In allowing this dangerous condition to exist, the defendants have acted with an 
utter disregard and indifference to the safety of the plaintiff, thus amounting to complete 
negligence. 
Furthermore, the inside ledge of the Washington Street sidewalk in Amelia 
Village was, and still is, a nuisance to the community. The existing public side~alk has 
a sharp drop off created and maintained by_the defendant. The dangerous condition of 
the Wa_~~!n_gton St!_~~t_~iqe~alk is t~~ cau~e of_~oshu~_ Maddox's significant and . 
permanent injuries at issue in this litigation. 
II. Argument 
A. Joshua Maddox's Nuisance Claim is Not Barred by Sovereign 
Immunity. 
The Commonwealth is lia~I~ under..the .theory. of nuisance for creating and 
maintaining a dangerous condition in the Washington Street sidewalk. The only 
defense the Commonwealth offers against Joshua Maddox's nuisance claim is brief and 
unsubstantiated. The only support the Commonwealth offers is a misconstrued excerpt 
from the case of Tay/orv. CityofChar/ottesvill~, 240 Va. 367, 397 S.E.2d 832 (1990), a 
case this defendant offers in support of his position. 
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia did not directly addre~s a nuisance claim 
against the Commonwealth in Taylor, it did address a similar set of facts in a claim 
-2-
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against the City of Charlottesville. See id. In Taylor, the City of Charlottesville was held 
liable for creating and maintaining a public nuisance. See id. In the case at bar, the 
Commonwealth created and maintained a nuisance in the Washington Street sidewalk. 
Similar to the City of Charlottesville, the Commonwealth allowed a dangerous condition 
to exist which posed a threat to the safety of those in the community. 
The Commonwealth is no longer afforded blanket protection from nuisance 
claims. The Commonwealth's argument asserting Taylor citing Kellam v. School Board, 
202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960), as the standard for barring nuisance claim~ simply 
misconstrues the actions of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Taylor. The Taylor case 
cited Kellam .mer~Jy JD respon~e to the City_ otyt')a~l_q:ttesvme~s argument in favor of 
sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of Virginia did not affirm its decision in 
Kellam, it simply differentiated the case from the Taylor's claim. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that at the time Kellam was decided, which 
was prior to the Tort Claims Act, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned that s~vereign 
immunity applied to causes of action in both negligence and nuisance. The Kellam · 
court went on to add the following, "If the strictness of the rule is to be relaxed in cases 
of nuisance, ... , the stripping process should be by legislative enactment and not by 
court decree." Id. at 259. In 1982, that legislative enactment took place with the 
codification of the Virginia Tort Claims Act, thus creating a cause of action in nuisance 
against the Commonwealth. 
Although the Tort Claims Act does not specifically state that a claim can be 
brought in nuisance .against the Commonwealth, the Act does enumerate when a claim 
-3-
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cannot be brought. If the legislature intended for sovereign immunity to bar claims 
sounding in nuisance, then it would have been set out among the eight types of claims 
excluded from Section 8.01-195.3 of the Act. 
It is well established in the courts of this Commonwealth that a statute must be 
interpreted on its face when it is clear and unambiguous. See Lynch v. Commonwealth 
Transp. Comm'r, 225 Va. 277, 495 S.E.2d 247 (1998); School Board v. School Board et 
al., 219 Va. 244, 247 S.E.2d 380 (1978). As stated by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 
Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182 Va. 418, 423, 29 S.E.2d 357, 358 (1944), "If ~he 
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly clear and 
definite, effect must be given to it regardless of what courts think of its wisdom or policy. 
In such cases courts must find the meaning within the statute itself." Id. (Citing Town of 
South Hill v. Allen, 177 Va. 154, 12 S.E.2d 770 (1941 ); Hammer v. Cqmmonwealth, 169 
Va. 355, 193 S.E. 496 (1937); Woodward v. Staunton, 161 Va. 671, 171 S.E. 590 
(1933);Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Town of Cape Charles, 144 Va~ 56, 131 S.E. 437 
(1926). Section 8.01-195.3 of the Tort Claims Act clearly states the exceptions where 
sovereign immunity provides protection .. Nuisance is not set out in those eight 
exceptions, thus the Tort Claims Act applies and sovereign immunity does not protect 
the Commonwealth. 
Furthermore, in Kellam, the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity in Virginia. See Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 
96 (1960) (Stating that educational activities are governmental in nature and holding 
that sovereign immunity applied.) The court noted that the Commonwealth and its 
-4-
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agencies are immune for liability when acting within the scope of their governmental 
capacities. See id. at 254 (Citing Mann v. County Board, 199 Va. 169, 98 S.E.2d 515 
(1957); Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919 Fry v. Albemarle 
County, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1889). The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that 
immunity was afforded when there was a governmental function at issue, but did not 
address the issue of the Commonwealth's proprietary functions. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the Commonwealth, similar to a municipality, 
has both governmental and proprietary functions. It is also reasonable to conc!ude that 
in determining the Commonwealth's liability, these functions must be considered, much 
lik~ they were in d~terfDining the City of C~arlqttesville's liability in Taylor. As held by · 
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Taylor, a nuisance claim is not barred by sovereign 
immunity because it attacks a proprietary function, which is not protected. 
In Taylor, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied this reasoning to municipalities. 
See also Woods v. Marion, 245 Va. 44, 425 S.E.2d 487 (1993) (Reversing and 
remanding case because circuit court had granted the defendant's plea of sovereign 
immunity although it was performing a proprietary function.); Bialk v. City of Hampton, 
242 Va. 56, 405 S.E.2d 619 (1991). Following this line of reasoning, the 
Commonwealth's actions in creating and maintaining the nuisance at issue are outside 
of its governmental function, thus sovereign immunity does not bar liability. 
B. Joshua Maddox's Negligence Claim is Not Barred by Sovereign 
Immunity Because the Commonwealth Acted with an Utter Disregard 
for the Safety of Others When it Constructed the Sidewalk at Issue. 




of others when they decided to leave the Washington Street sidewalk in a state of 
potential danger. The Commonwealth departed from its planned procedure to backfill 
the area abutting the publi9 sidewalk or, in the alternative, to install a retaining wall next 
to the sidewalk. 
The Commonwealth decided to deviate from its original plans providing a safe 
sidewalk passage for the people of Amelia County. In failing to protect the public from 
the dangerous situation it created, the Commonwealth acted with gross negligence. As 
defined by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Frazier v. City of Norfolk, 234 Va. ~88, 362 
S.E.2d 688, (1987), gross negligence exists when a defendant has demonstrated an 
"utter disregard .of prudence amou11!i!lg to complete neglect of the safety of another.~' 
Id. at 393. 
Under the Tort Claims Act, the Commonwealth is only granted ~overei.gn 
immunity in certain enumerated functions. Although immunity is granted when a state 
agency is performing a legislative function, when that function is departed from and 
discretion is abused, protection is no longer provided. In the case at bar, the 
Commonwealth acted with an utter disregard for Joshua Maddox's safezy, thus it cannot 
seek protection under the shroud of sovereign immunity. 
Ill. Conclusion 
For the forgoing reasons, this plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny 
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1 THE COURT: All right. On behalf of Amelia County 
2 and VDOT 
3 MS. MOORE: Your Honor, this has actually taken a 
4 bit of a turn, and this case was before you once before in a 
5 form that I believe you were residing. My name is Scott 
6 Moore and I'm here on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
7 THE COURT: Your name is Scott what? 
8 MS. MOORE: Scott Moore. 
9 THE COURT: Moore, okay. 
10 MS. MOORE: And this case originally was filed 
11 against VDOT and the County of Amelia, and you heard us a bit 
12 ago and made some rulings that caused that case to be 
13 disposed of, and it is brought back now in the name of Joshua 
14 Maddox against the Corrunonwealth of Virginia. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MS. MOORE: As a factual matter, it's all part of 
17 the same case. It's just a new incarnation. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MS. MOORE: And the Commonwealth has filed a --
20 THE COURT: Both of you have filed a memorandum 
21 regarding your demurrer; is that right? 
22 MS. MOORE: That's correct. 
23 THE COURT: On the grounds of sovereign immunity, 
24 and what else? 
25 MS. MOORE: Well, there was also the issue of 




























punitive damages that were alleged in the motion for judgment 
and the Commonwealth -- it's also immunity, but it's sort of 
a second arm of that immunity argument, which that is in 
addition to being immune on the substance of the actions, the 
Commonwealth is immune from damages awarded -- punitive 
damages awarded against it. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you did send me memorandums. 
I think it was the beginning of last week. I meant to have 
them with me today, but I don't. 
MS. MOORE: We'll do our best. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. PEMBERTON: Good morning, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tell me your name again. 
MS. PEMBERTON: Jayne Pemberton. 
THE COURT: Ms. Pemberton? 
MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I remember seeing you in Nottoway last 
week. Okay. Are you ready, Ms. Pemberton, on behalf of the 
plaintiff, Mr. Maddox? 
MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If I recall, and correct me if I'm 
wrong, your client was riding a bicycle on a sidewalk 
somewhere around in the village and went off the edge of the 
sidewalk and was hurt. 
MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, sir. 




1 THE COURT: They're the allegations. 
2 MS. PEMBERTON: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: And you are suing at this point the 
4 Commonwealth for -- is it a negligent design? 
5 MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, Your Honor. We sued for 
6 negligent design and construction and maintenance, and then 
7 we also brought a nuisance claim for allowing a dangerous 
8 condition to exist. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Well, do you -- I'm not 
10 trying to get you to give up on this negligent design, but 
11 are you pretty much proceeding on the nuisance claim? 
12 MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Generally negligent design is not 
14 recoverable in Virginia against the Commonwealth, is it? 
15 MS. PEMBERTON: No, Your Honor, it falls within one 
16 of the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act, which is the 
17 legislative function and. duty. We concede that, but we also 
18 argue that the Conunonwealth in this instance departed from 
19 their original plan, and in doing so it was willful and 
20 wanton disregard for public safety because they left about a 
21 two-foot drop off of a sidewalk. 
22 THE COURT: Could I have seen that sidewalk if I'm 
23 walking across the street from the courthouse right next to 
24 Judge --
25 MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, sir. 
COOK & WILEY, INC. 
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1 THE COURT: Is that it? 
2 MS. PEMBERTON: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: I guess that's neither here nor there, 
4 but it gives me some idea of what we're talking about. 
5 All right. Ms. Moore, it's your defense in motion. 
6 I'll let you go ahead. 
7 MS. MOORE: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I appreciate 
a that. I will try to take up as briefly as you believe is 
9 appropriate the first question, and that is the legislative 
10 immunity issue, and just to clarify, Ms. Pemberton in her 
11 memorandum raised the issue of whether gross negligence may 
12 cause that claim to survive an allegation for gross 
13 ( negligence. 
14 First of all, I don't believe there are any factual 
15 allegations contained in their motion for judgment that would 
• 
16 justify a finding for gross negligence or even permit that 
17 reasonably to go forward. But more importantly legally where 
18 the Commonwealth has immunity because there is a legislative 
19 function, that immunity is absolute regardless of the degree 
20 of negligence involved. I do have some additional circuit 
21 court case law if it would be helpful to you. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Sure, I'd be glad to 
23 consider it. 
24 MS. MOORE: Patrick County, Leesburg, Fairfax, 
25 Albemarle, Nelson, and Buckingham have at various times 




























conunented on this issue, the legislative immunity, in 
particular in the design and construction of various roadways 
and structures surrounding there, and in each case have said 
that the legislative immunity is an absolute immunity. It's 
different from the immunity that is preserved to an extent by 
the Tort Claims Act. 
In the Tort Claims Act the Conunonwealth has said 
under limited circumstances in specific circumstances we will 
permit you to proceed with an action against the Commonwealth 
if you follow all the proper procedures. The legislative 
immunity is an absolute immunity, and it survives and more 
specifically carved out of the Tort Claims Act. 
As I said, regardless of the degree of negligence, 
whether simple negligence or gross negligence, the 
Commonwealth retains that immunity for legislative function 
in this case, the design of the sidewalk. And although the 
allegation is we had potentially one design and then moved to 
another design, and that obviously would be a factual issue 
at trial, but regardless of the truth of that, that is 
exactly what the Commonwealth is protected against through 
that legislative immunity. 
When the Commonwealth is seeking to make those 
decisions for the construction of its roadways and all of the 
attending structures, that is exactly the immunity that the 
Conunonwealth needs, and that is the immunity from second 




























guessing. We have to build -- the Commonwealth has to build 
its roads and provide its services all over this state and 
that inununity affords the, you know, moving forward with 
those various design decisions that the Tort Claims Act has 
carved out and maintained. 
Very briefly, also I mention that the statute 
explicitly says that the Commonwealth will not be liable for 
any punitive damages. That's just black letter law against 
its own statute. I don't know that that's specifically 
commented on in the memorandum. It may be that that's not 
really an issue here today. I'll address it further if the 
Court feels it's necessary. 
The nuisance issue as you pointed out is more the 
crux of the memos that were filed. And I think the Taylor 
and Kellam cases are the ones that we really are looking at 
at this point. 
THE COURT: Say those again. 
MS. MOORE: Taylor and Kellam. Taylor was out of 
the City of Charlottesville, and Kellam was a case involving 
a school board. Taylor was against a municipal corporation, 
against the City of Charlottesville, and the Supreme Court in 
Taylor looked at Kellam, the school board case, and drew the 
line for us and basically said, states and their agencies and 
actors benefit from the immunity granted to the Commonwealth; 
whereas the municipal corporation has certain immunities but 




























they're not as broad as those made available to the 
Conunonwealth. And that line really is drawn in Taylor. 
There is some discussion in plaintiff's memorandum 
that the Tort Claims Act changes that, but Taylor is a case 
that was decided in 1990, and Taylor discusses that 
distinction. The Conunonwealth versus the municipal 
corporation, and how the Conunonwealth does in fact have 
greater immunity than a municipal corporation would have. 
In the Taylor case, ultimately the decision was 
made that the municipal corporation, the City of 
Charlottesville, was not immune. But in that case, the trial 
court had said Kellam, the school board case, should apply, 
and that was where the Supreme Court said, no, because this 
is a municipal corporation and not an arm of the 
Commonwealth, it is not going to benefit from our Kellam 
immunity. And in this case, it is the Commonwealth. It's 
the Virginia Department of Transportation, the Commonwealth 
is defendant in this action here today, and based on those 
two cases, it's our position that the inununity would be 
maintained as to a nuisance claim. 
THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Pemberton. 
MS. PEMBERTON: Your Honor, if you'd like to -- I 
brought a couple of extra copies of Taylor and Kellam. 
THE COURT: Okay. It won't hurt anything. Thank 
you. 





























MS. PEMBERTON: It's our position that, and I want 
to concentrate on the nuisance claim here, because I do feel 
that that is the strongest claim made. Taylor although it 
was the city, very similar circumstances to this case. And 
in Taylor, although the negligence claim failed in Taylor, 
because there weren't factual allegations arising willful and 
wanton, there was a nuisance claim that survived. And in 
this case, it's no different what the Commonwealth did. They 
created a dangerous situation and they allowed it to continue 
as a threat to the public, the same as the City of 
Charlottesville in that case. 
Now, the Tort Claims Act is clear. It's not an 
exception to the rule. It does differ from the conunon law, 
but the first sentence of it says the Conunonwealth shall be 
liable for claims for money, and it goes on and to say for 
personal injuries, or death, and then it lists eight 
exceptions, eight specific exceptions to that rule. And that 
language, the Commonwealth shall be liable. The Commonwealth 
must be accountable for these actions unless it's one of 
these eight exceptions. A nuisance, the maintaining of a 
dangerous condition is not one of those eight exceptions. 
For the same reason the Commonwealth argues their claim for 
punitive damages, if you got it in the statute, you have to 
follow the statute, and we have it. The Commonwealth shall 
be liable. 



























Now, the Commonwealth argues that Taylor cited 
Kellam somehow enforces the distinction between the two. We 
would argue that that's not what Taylor purported doing. 
First of all, the issue in front of the Taylor court was a 
city, a city being sued in nuisance. 
11 
The Virginia Supreme Court didn't touch the issue 
of the Commonwealth being sued in nuisance. It wasn't before 
the Court. They didn't have to. The City of Charlottesville 
argued Kellam, and the Virginia Supreme Court set ~t apart. 
But by doing so, it's dicta and it's nothing more, and in no 
way affirms the decision of the Kellam Court. And when you 
look at Kellam, Kellam was decided in 1960 prior to the Tort 
Claims Act. And the reasoning of the Kellam Court -- the 
Kellam Court even goes on to say, right now, you can't sue 
the Commonwealth, and it's not for me, the Court, to change 
the law. It's for the legislatures to go in and change the 
law and make a distinction, and they did in 1982 with the 
Tort Claims Act. 
So our argument is that what has happened here in 
Amelia with the Commonwealth creating and maintaining that 
nuisance that there is a recoverable claim under the Tort 
Claims Act, because it's not one of the eight exceptions. 
The facts are similar. It goes beyond where they should be 
protected. It's a proprietary function of the Commonwealth 
just as it would be a proprietary function of the City of 



























Charlottesville to maintain those. 
In Kellam, the Virginia Supreme Court talked about 
that difference of governmental and proprietary. And if it 
was proprietary for the City of Charlottesville to maintain 
that roadway, it's closely parallel to say that it was a 
proprietary function of the Commonwealth to maintain the 
dangerous situation that Joshua Maddox was injured on. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Moore? 
12 
MS. MOORE: Your Honor, briefly, three essential 
issues. One is there is a very basic factual difference 
between the two cases, and that is in the City of 
Charlottesville Taylor case, there was a history and there 
were allegations of a long line of complaints. This is as I 
think you may recall if you're personally familiar with the 
area, relatively new construction for one thing, and there's 
been no allegation of such complaints, on-going complaints. 
Frankly, I don't think that ultimately is an issue. I think 
that it can be disposed of on legal grounds, and that is that 
you begin from the premise that the Commonwealth is imrnune. 
That is our starting point. 
To the extent the statute has waived that immunity 
and has given a process by which that inununity can be 
overcome, that's how the plaintiff gets into the public 
coffers, and as we all know, that is what the immunity was 
designed to do, is to protect public functions and public 




























money. And in this case, the Taylor Court did say, you 
didn't make that distinction and did say that, and this is 
Taylor, City of Charlottesville, 1990 case, the Virginia 
Supreme Court said, spoke back to the Kellam case, we held 
that governmental immunity applied to the nuisance claim. We 
emphasized that school boards are agents or instrumentalities 
of the state and partake of the state's sovereig~ty with 
respect to tort liability. We emphasized that school boards 
being state agencies are different from true municipal 
corporations. 
So even though -- I hear the argument that, well, 
this is the same thing as the City and the Commonwealth. 
It's the same thing, but it's not. 
THE COURT: Any comment on the sidewalk 
proprietary, governmental 
MS. MOORE: That is thank you, and that is the 
last of my concerns is that that is an issue for a municipal 
corporation. That is an issue for individual commonwealth 
employees if they are sued, what were they doing, and what 
was their function, but for the Commonwealth itself, that's 
not really part of the consideration. The Commonwealth as an 
entity defendant, that's not part of the consideration. That 
is part of the Taylor case, because it's a municipal 
corporation, but that is not part of the Commonwealth issue. 
The Commonwealth has a much broader immunity than municipal 




























corporations such as the City of Charlottesville --
THE COURT: Well, I think that's probably true, but 
again, is the sidewalk proprietary or governmental function 
or --
MS. MOORE: It depends on what part of it you're 
talking about. If you're talking about -- and what the 
allegation is and what was discussed in the memorandum is the 
the planning and construction of changes to the area. We 
were guilty of negligence, careless, recklessness i~ planning 
and constructing the changes at issue in this area. Planning 
and construction are pure and simple for legislative immunity 
function. 
THE COURT: Governmental function? 
MS. MOORE: They are governmental functions of the 
highest or that -- the cases that I have given to you, those 
six or seven jurisdictions 
THE COURT: It's not a highway or roadway or 
bridge, is it? It's a sidewalk. 
MS. MOORE: It would be like saying, well, we put a 
bike path right down the middle of Interstate 95, but it's a 
bike path. That is all part of the highway construction, the 
roadway construction. That's all considered part of the 
legislature, and there are some specific cases among the ones 
that I've given to you that discuss the fact that it's not 
just the physical roadway, but it is the pertinent structures 





























THE COURT: All right, thank you. Is there 
something else you want to give me, Ms Pemberton? 
MS. PEMBERTON: Just briefly, as far as 
governmental --
THE COURT: Is there something else you want to 
give me? I think you argued that. 
MS. PEMBERTON: Okay. I was just going to --
THE COURT: Okay. Well, you've had your shot and 
she's had her shot. 
Thank you very much. I'm not ready to rule. I 
believe both of you have filed sketches, did you not, and 
did I ask you to submit sketches along with the --
MS. MOORE: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: Well, if you would, I would appreciate 
it. 
MS. MOORE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I do want to review -- I thought I had 
it with me. I read them last week and I'm not ready to rule. 
I will do that when I'm ready. 
MS. MOORE: Which office do you prefer? 
THE COURT: Send them to Nottoway if you would. 
Thank you very much. 
MS. MOORE: Thank you. 
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INSTRUMENT -ONTROL # 200300080 
VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, an infant 
Who sues by his parents and next 
Friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, 
v. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. L02-57 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of the Plea of Immunity offered by the defendant, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, by counsel; and, 
Having heard argument from counsel for the parties; and 
Finding it is in the interest of justice to do so, this Court, SUSTAINS the Commonwealth 
of Virginia's Plea for the reasons stated in its memorandum and stated on the record at the 
hearing of February 3, 2003, and hereby ORDERS that the Motion for Judgment is DISMISSED 
as to the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
The Clerk is directed to send executed and attested copies of this Order to all parties and 
counsel of record. 
ENTERd ~d 
Judge Thomas V. Warren 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMELIA 
JOSHUA MADDOX, 
An Infant who sues by his Parents 
and Next of Friends, 
Tom and Amy Maddox, 
v. 
COMMONWEAL TH OF VIRGINIA, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No.: L02-57 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Joshua Maddox, an Infant who sues by his Parents 
and Next Friends, Tom and Amy Maddox, pursuant to Rul 5:9 of the Rt..iles of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, and notices hi~ appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia of 
the Final Order rendered by this Court on February 10, 2003. 
The plaintiff hereby ·certifies that he has ordered a transcript of the pro_ceedings 
from the court reporter who reported the case. 
Furthermore, the transcript of the February 3, 2003, hearing on the defendant's 
Plea of Sovereign Immunity has been ordered and will be filed as provided by Rule 5:11 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
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